Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs
Volume 1

Issue 2

November 2012

To Forgive and Forget: How Reconciliation and Amnesty
Legislation in Afghanistan Forgives War Criminals while
Forgetting their Victims
Sara L. Carlson

Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia
Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons,
International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and
Public Administration Commons, Rule of Law Commons, Social History Commons, and the Transnational
Law Commons

ISSN: 2168-7951
Recommended Citation
Sara L. Carlson, To Forgive and Forget: How Reconciliation and Amnesty Legislation in Afghanistan
Forgives War Criminals while Forgetting their Victims, 1 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 390 (2012).
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol1/iss2/9

The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and
School of International Affairs.

Penn State
Journal of Law & International Affairs
2012

VOLUME 1 NO. 2

TO FORGIVE AND FORGET:
HOW RECONCILIATION AND AMNESTY
LEGISLATION IN AFGHANISTAN
FORGIVES WAR CRIMINALS WHILE
FORGETTING THEIR VICTIMS
Sara L. Carlson*
INTRODUCTION
In 2009, after more than two generations of civil war and
armed conflict, the controversial National Reconciliation, General
Amnesty and National Stability Law (“Reconciliation and Amnesty
Law”) became effective in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.1 This
law aims to aid in the reconciliation process of former and current

* J.D. candidate, 2012, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State
University. Gratitude is owed and duly given to my husband for his patience,
support, and love and to the two little boys who blessed me with the title of
“Mommy,” for they also sacrificed so that I could chase a dream. Lastly, this
comment is dedicated to my friends, comrades, and fellow veterans and their families whose undaunted courage and immeasurable sacrifices will forever hold a place
in my heart and to whom “thank you” will never be enough.
1 See National Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and National Stability
Law, Official Gazette, 965 of 13 Qaus 1387, Dec. 2009 (Afg.), art. 3 [hereinafter
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law], http://dkiafghanistan.um.dk/da/~/media/
dkiafghanistan/Documents/Other/National%20Reconciliation%20and%20Amnes
ty%20Law.ashx.
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armed fighters, in turn bringing an end to decades of war.2
Specifically, the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law authorizes amnesty
from prosecution to perpetrators of hostile actions committed
against the government of Afghanistan prior to the interim
administration taking effect in late 2001. It also provides a path to
amnesty for those committing subsequent and future hostile acts
against the Afghan government.3 In July of 2010, after nearly a
decade of failed programs that sought to implement reintegration
guidelines for reconciled fighters, the government of Afghanistan
approved the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
(“APRP”).4 The APRP provides a functioning framework for
reconciliation and reintegration of combatants. Its aim is to achieve a
sustainable peace in Afghanistan.5 This framework calls for the
implementation of a broad spectrum of policies to reconcile former
anti-government fighters, and attempts to succeed where previous
reconciliation and reintegration programs fell short.6 Despite the lofty
aspirational goals of these legislative efforts, implementation has and
will continue to fail a critical party: the victims.
This comment will analyze the reconciliation framework as
delineated by the APRP and the implementation of the
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law. Part I of this comment will provide
a brief overview of transitional justice7 as a solution to human rights

See id.
See id.
4 See DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION COMMISSION, AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM 3, July 7, 2010 [hereinafter APRP].
5 See id.
6 See TAZREENA SAJJAD, AFG. RESEARCH & EVALUATION UNIT, PEACE
AT ALL COSTS: REINTEGRATION AND RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN (2010)
[hereinafter PEACE AT ALL COSTS], http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/
EditionPdfs/1035E-Peace%20at%20all%20Costs%20IP%202010%20web.pdf
(providing a detailed discussion of the APRP in its entirety).
7 Transitional justice “refers to the set of judicial and non-judicial
measures that have been implemented by countries in order to redress the legacies
of massive human rights abuses. These measures include criminal prosecutions,
truth commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional reforms.” What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. [hereinafter What is Transitional Justice?], http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (last updated 2012).
2
3
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abuses and the applicable law in Afghanistan.8 While the best
approach to transitional justice relies on a comprehensive process
including individualized responses to the judicial and non-judicial
factors that traditionally define transitional justice,9 this comment
focuses only on the APRP’s approach to reconciliation and the
existing legislation. Part II will provide the historical framework
necessary to understand the current implications of the recently
enacted Reconciliation and Amnesty Law.10 Part III will describe
briefly Afghanistan’s previous efforts at reconciliation, and examine
why those efforts failed.11 Part IV will explore the APRP as it is
currently being implemented,12 and Part V will describe its interplay
with the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law.13 Part V also will examine
how the current legislative framework falls short of its objectives.14
This comment will expose several problems that may arise as a result
of combining the APRP’s plan for reintegration and reconciliation
with the existing reconciliation legislation. It will also propose
recommendations for modifying the existing legislation. Recognizing
that the armed conflict in Afghanistan continues, this comment will
conclude by asserting that the failure to recognize victims’ rights,
while awarding amnesty to past and present war criminals, will
significantly harm the reconciliation process, and ultimately delay the
country’s ability to achieve sustainable peace.

See infra Part I.
See Louis Bickford, Transitional Justice, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1045, 1045-47 (Dinah Shelton ed.,
2004); see also What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 7 (providing a brief overview of
transitional justice by defining the term and describing its historical roots and future relevance in international law).
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part V.
14 See infra Part V.
8
9
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I. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AS A SOLUTION
A. Innocent Victims
His name is Shafiq and he is purportedly eleven years old,
though he appears no more than nine.15 Most children his age spend
their days attending school, playing soccer, or flying kites. Shafiq,
however, spends his days preparing to enter the practice of bacha bazi,
or “dancing boys.”16 Bacha bazi, an ancient practice recently
resurrected, involves pre-pubescent boys dressed in women’s
clothing performing dances for the entertainment of wealthy and
powerful men.17 It is a symbol of power, prestige, and social status
among warlords, drug lords, and past and present insurgent
commanders in the war torn country of Afghanistan.18 Unfortunately
for the young boys forced into this criminal enterprise, the silence of
the music and the end of the dance often leads to unspeakable crimes
as the boys frequently transition to the role of sex slave.19 Shafiq
thought he would be learning a new trade as an apprentice under the
watchful tutelage of his new master when his impoverished and
destitute family sold him because they needed money.20 Shafiq had no
way of knowing that his world would change forever in the most
cruel and horrendous ways imaginable.
Now consider the life of a young woman whose father
promised her to a local Taliban fighter at the age of twelve.21 Her
15 See Frontline: The Dancing Boys of Afghanistan (PBS television broadcast
Apr. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Dancing Boys], http://video.pbs.org/video/1474778660.
16 See Zadzi, Boys in Afghanistan Sold Into Prostitution, Sexual Slavery,
DIGITAL J., Nov. 20, 2007, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/246409.
17 See Dancing Boys, supra note 15.
18 See Zadzi, supra note 16.
19 See id.; see also Youngbee Dale, Bacha Bazi: Pedophilia and Child Trafficking
Justified by the Tradition in Afghanistan, EXAMINER, Feb. 23, 2010,
http://www.examiner.com/article/bacha-bazi-pedophilia-and-child-traffickingjustified-by-the-tradition-afghanistan.
20 See Dancing Boys, supra note 15.
21 See Aryn Baker, Afghan Women and the Return of the Taliban, TIME, Aug.
9, 2010 [hereinafter Baker, Afghan Women], http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,2007407,00.html; see also Karen Grigsby Bates, Bibi Aisha, Disfigured
Afghan Woman Featured on ‘Time’ Cover, Visits U.S., NPR NEWS BLOG (Oct. 13, 2010,
12:57 AM) [hereinafter Bates, Bibi Aisha], http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
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personal courage and will to live now serve as inspiration to the
world.22 Aisha married the Talib fighter when she was only fourteen
and she soon fell victim to unspeakable domestic abuse at the hands
of her husband and her in-laws.23 In 2009, at the age of eighteen, she
found the courage to escape but was quickly caught and returned to
her abusive husband.24 The local Taliban commander, serving as the
local unofficial judge, decided the reprisal she would face for her
actions would serve to deter similar acts by other young wives in the
future.25 Taliban fighters, including her husband, delivered the
punishment with reckless abandon as they pulled out a knife, held her
down, and sliced off Aisha’s ears and nose.26 Passing out from the
pain, Aisha awakened when she began to choke on the blood
streaming down the back of her throat.27 She had been left to die by
the brutal executors of Taliban justice in the mountains of
Afghanistan.28
In a world where innocence should be the tie that binds
children across continents, these horrific accounts paint a very
different picture of the harsh reality that many children in countries
plagued by war and civil strife continue to face. The concept of
transitional justice serves as a framework for addressing the past
crimes and abuses of victims like Shafiq and the present crimes that

way/2010/10/13/130527903/bibi-aisha-disfigured-afghan-woman-featured-ontime-cover-visits-u-s.
22 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.
23 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.
24 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.
25 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.
26 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.
27 See Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.
28 While Aisha’s story has all of the hallmarks of a modern day nightmare, her future is looking brighter. Shortly after she awoke on the mountainside,
she managed to crawl to her grandfather’s home and she was covertly transported
to a U.S. military medical facility. Aisha was stabilized and placed in a secret shelter
in Kabul where she remained until October of 2010 when she was transported to a
private medical facility in California. She has since begun the arduous reconstructive surgery process, at no cost to her, but the healing process is far from over. See
Baker, Afghan Women, supra note 21; Bates, Bibi Aisha, supra note 21.
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women like Aisha endure despite existing legislation designed to
prevent such brutality.29
B. Transitional Justice in Afghanistan
Transitional justice combines traditional judicial processes,
such as prosecuting those accused of human rights violations, with
non-judicial efforts.30 These non-judicial efforts include: creating fora
such as truth commissions to investigate past abuses,31 establishing a
system for reparations to victims of past abuse or violence,
memorializing the victims of violence, transforming government
security institutions such as police and military to ensure future
violations do not occur and to restore trust in the government, and
reconciling divided factions of society.32
In 2005, the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (“GIRoA”), in collaboration with the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission and the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, developed the Peace,
Reconciliation and Justice in Afghanistan Action Plan (“Justice
Action Plan”).33 This comprehensive plan incorporated five actions
to promote peace, reconciliation, and justice in Afghanistan while
creating a culture of respect for human rights and accountability for

29 See Bickford, Transitional Justice, supra note 9, at 1045-47; see also What is
Transitional Justice?, supra note 7.
30 See Bickford, Transitional Justice, supra note 9, at 1045-47.
31 A truth commission, though varied in its administration, is a “victimcentered commission of inquiry set up in and authorized by a state for the primary
purposes of (1) investigating and reporting on the principal causes and consequences of broad and relatively recent patterns of severe violence or repression that
occurred in the state during determinate periods of abusive rule or conflict and (2)
making recommendations for their redress and future prevention.” ERIC
WIEBELHAUS-BRAHM, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: THE
IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 3-4 (2010).
32 Bickford, Transitional Justice, supra note 9 at 1045-47; What is Transitional
Justice?, supra note 7.
33 See PEACE, RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN: ACTION
PLAN OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
[hereinafter JUSTICE ACTION PLAN], http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/
Reports/Thematic%20reports/Action_Pln_Gov_Af.pdf.
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human rights violations.34 Following the traditional model for
transitional justice, these actions include: “(1) acknowledgement of
the suffering of the Afghan People; (2) ensuring credible and
accountable state institutions; (3) truth-seeking and documentation;
(4) promotion of reconciliation and national unity; and (5)
establishment of effective and reasonable accountability
mechanisms.”35
Unfortunately, the government has failed to exercise the
Justice Action Plan’s comprehensive approach to addressing both
perpetrators of human rights violations and, more importantly, their
victims.36 Ironically, this is likely due to the passage of the
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, a law allegedly meant to
supplement the Justice Action Plan’s reconciliation ‘key action,’ but
which has instead stifled the reconciliation process.37 The legislators’
need for self-preservation trumped justice. They likely passed the
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law due to fears that some of them
would face prosecution for previous human rights violations
committed either by their own hands or by those under their
control.38 Their legislation left yet another reminder of corruption in
government by providing for the broad amnesty of criminals,
including some members of the government, while essentially closing
the door to victims seeking justice.39 Guidance from the
Disarmament and Reintegration Commission addressing the
implementation of the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law focuses on
the recently approved Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
and abandons the Justice Action Plan and its comprehensive
transitional justice model.40

See id.
Id.
36 See MICHAEL SEMPLE, RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN 59 (2009).
37 See Afghanistan: Justice Action Plan Heading for Oblivion, IRIN, Apr. 14,
2010, http://www.irinnews.org/Report/88807/AFGHANISTAN-Justice-actionplan-heading-for-oblivion.
38 See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 59.
39 See JUSTICE ACTION PLAN, supra note 33; Afghanistan: Justice Action Plan
Heading for Oblivion, supra note 37.
40 See SAJJAD, PEACE AT ALL COSTS, supra note 6.
34
35
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C. Abandoning Transitional Justice: What Now?
In March of 2007, the Afghan Parliament passed the
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law.41 Despite the fact that President
Karzai never signed the bill,42 in accordance with the Afghan
Constitution, it became law after a fifteen day lapse.43 The legislative
process in Afghanistan provides that a bill will take effect only after it
is published in the Official Gazette, even though it has passed and
has effectively become law. In the case of the Reconciliation and
Amnesty Law, publication in the Official Gazette did not occur until
December of 2009, more than two years after its passage.44 The
furtive publication of the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law was met
with controversy from human rights advocates because of the broad,
sweeping nature of the law’s amnesty provision for eligible
perpetrators of past, present, and potential future crimes.45
Specifically, Article 3 of the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law states
that:
(1) All political factions and hostile parties who were
involved in one way or another in hostilities before
establishing of the Interim Administration shall be
included in the reconciliation and general amnesty
program for the purpose of reconciliation among
different segments of society, strengthening of peace
and stability and starting of new life in the
contemporary political history of Afghanistan, and

41 See Sari Kouvo, After Two Years in Legal Limbo: A First Glance at the Approved ‘Amnesty Law’, AFG. ANALYSTS NETWORK, Feb. 22, 2010, http://aanafghanistan.com/index.asp?id=665.
42 President Hamid Karzai is the president of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan.
43 THE CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN Jan. 3, 2004, art. 94,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/404d8a594.html; see also Jon Boone, Afghanistan Quietly Brings Into Force Taliban Amnesty Law, GUARDIAN, Feb. 11, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/feb/11/taliban-amnesty-law-enacted.
44 See Jonathon Burch, U.N. Calls for Repeal of Afghan Amnesty Law,
REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/03/25/idINIndia47212320100325.
45 See Boone, Afghanistan Quietly Brings Into Force Taliban Amnesty Law, supra
note 43; Burch, U.N. Calls for Repeal of Afghan Amnesty Law, supra note 44.

397

2012

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

1:2

enjoy all their legal rights and shall not be legally and
judicially prosecuted.
(2) Those individuals and groups who are still in
opposition to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
and cease enmity after the enforcement of this
resolution and join the process of national
reconciliation, and respect the Constitution and other
laws and abide them shall enjoy the benefits of this
resolution.
(3) The provisions set forth in clause (1) and (2) of
this article shall not affect the claims of individuals
against individuals based upon Haqullabd (rights of
people) and criminal offences in respect of individual
crimes.46
The practical effect of this article is that the government of
Afghanistan has permitted members of insurgent groups presently
opposing the government, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani
Network, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, to seek amnesty without
question of past crimes, and perhaps even without concern for future
acts.47 However, the reach of the law also extends to those members
of opposition groups that fought prior to the events of September
11, 2001.48 These opposition forces include the anti-government
mujahedeen fighters who fought to expel the former Soviet Union
during their invasion of Afghanistan beginning in December of
1979,49 the opposing factions fighting for power in the civil war that
followed,50 and, more recently, the rise of the Taliban.51

Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, supra note 1, art. 3.
See AHMED RASHID, DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE U.S. AND THE
DISASTER IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA 240-47 (2009) [hereinafter RASHID, DESCENT].
48 See Kouvo, After Two Years in Legal Limbo: A First Glance at the Approved
‘Amnesty Law’, supra note 41.
49 See STEPHEN TANNER, AFGHANISTAN: A MILITARY HISTORY FROM
ALEXANDER THE GREAT TO THE WAR AGAINST THE TALIBAN 235-37 (rev. ed.
2009) (2002).
50 See id. at 277-83.
46
47
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Representatives from Afghanistan’s government recently
participated in a global conference to discuss what has become
known as the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Plan (APRP).52
The APRP sets forth the policy and framework, as proposed by the
National Directorate of Security, that the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan shall take as it moves toward achieving a unified and
peaceful nation.53 The APRP sets out the peace and reintegration
approach in two overarching categories: operational and
strategic/political.54 The operational category focuses on the low-level
fighters, or foot soldiers, while the strategic/political category focuses
on the senior level leadership of the insurgency.55 The framework
provided by the APRP for the reconciliation of anti-government
fighters relies on existing legislation, specifically the highly debated
Reconciliation and Amnesty Law passed in 2008, and the Afghan
Constitution.56 To fully understand how the APRP and existing laws
will impact today’s reconciliation efforts, it is important to
understand the recent history of Afghanistan that the Reconciliation
and Amnesty Law encompasses.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THREE DECADES OF WAR AND
BRUTALITY
A. The End of the Monarchy, The Beginning of Communism
Modern Afghanistan arose from the ashes of considerable
civil strife and political turmoil as well as foreign invasion and
occupation. Reaching back to the era of King Zahir Shah, the
country struggled to balance establishing a democratic, constitutional
society with maintaining a monarch state, resulting in intense political
instability.57 In 1973, former Prime Minster Daoud initiated a
See id. at 283-87.
APRP, supra note 4, at 3.
53 See id.
54 Id. at 6-7, 10.
55 See id.
56 See id. at 6.
57 See CHARLES H. BRISCOE ET AL., WEAPON OF CHOICE: U.S. ARMY
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN 8-9 (2003); TANNER, supra note
49, at 227-29.
51
52
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successful coup and ended King Zahir’s reign.58 Five years in to
Daoud’s presidency, the instability had grown even more tenuous as
his attempt institute a new constitution failed and his foreign policy
deepened resentment from the Communist People’s Democratic
Party of Afghanistan59 (PDPA).60 In April 1978, following violent
attacks on the capital city of Kabul that resulted in the murder of
Daoud and nearly two thousand innocent civilians, Nur Mohammad
Taraki, the leader of the PDPA, appointed himself to be the
President of Afghanistan.61
Taraki wasted no time implementing new Marxist policies and
received assistance from an influx of Soviet advisors. 62 Much to
Taraki’s dismay, the Afghan people, in particular the rural villagers,
found his social reform policies to be an abomination of their
traditional way of life, and they began to revolt.63 During efforts to
quell these uprisings, government troops under Taraki’s orders killed
thousands of innocent civilians.64 In September of 1979, President
Taraki was murdered and replaced by his deputy, Hafizullah Amin. 65
Amin found himself the leader of a country in a full-scale civil war.66
Because of growing displeasure with Amin’s performance and his
See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; TANNER, supra note 49, at 229.
Nur Mohammed Taraki founded the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan (PDPA) in January of 1965. An ideologically Communist party, the
PDPA received funding from the KGB and guidance from Moscow. After a short
time, the PDPA divided into the predominantly Pashtun and significantly more
radical Khalq faction, led by Taraki, and the intellectual Parcham group, led by
Babrak Karmal. See TANNER, supra note 49, at 228.
60 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; TANNER, supra note 49, at 22931.
61 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; TANNER, supra note 49, at 22931.
62 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9-10; STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS:
THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE
SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001, at 42-47 (2005); TANNER, supra note
49, at 230-32.
63 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; TANNER, supra note 49, at 23132.
64 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 232-33.
65 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 9; COLL, supra note 62, at 46-47;
TANNER, supra note 49, at 233.
66 See COLL, supra note 62, at 46-47; TANNER, supra note 49, at 233.
58
59
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inability to implement the Soviet agenda, Moscow decided an
intervention in Afghanistan was imperative.67
B. The Soviet Occupation
On Christmas Eve in 1979, Soviet Army troops arrived and
quickly took control of the Kabul International Airport.68 Three days
later, they stormed the Darulaman Palace in Kabul and killed
President Amin allowing Moscow’s replacement choice, Babrak
Karmal, to assume the presidential role.69 The brutality of the Soviet
invasion would effectively end the civil uprisings, but not because it
ended the fighting.70 While the Soviets thought they were coming to
Afghanistan to provide assistance to the Afghan Army, the invasion
of the foreign troops invoked a sense of unity in the Afghan people
that went beyond any tribal affiliation, political party, or ethnic group
resulting in the mujahedeen.71 While the mujahedeen found unity in the
common enemy of the Soviet, they lacked structure beyond their
common purpose.72 By the summer of 1980, only one third of the
Afghan Army the Soviets sought to reinforce were loyal to the
Soviets.73
With Soviet-loyal President Karmal failing to unify a divided
country brutalized by Soviet occupation, Iran and Pakistan took
advantage of the mujahedeen and began to covertly introduce support
to rid the region of Soviet influence.74 In 1986, then Soviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev expressed immense disapproval of Karmal’s
failure to heal the “bleeding wound”75 that the military situation in
See COLL, supra note 62, at 46-50; TANNER, supra note 49, at 233.
See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 10; COLL, supra note 62, at 46-47;
TANNER, supra note 49, at 233.
69 See COLL, supra note 62, at 50-52; TANNER, supra note 49, at 235-58.
70 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 11; TANNER, supra note 49, at
241.
71 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 11; TANNER, supra note 49, at
238-44.
72 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 248.
73 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 12.
74 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 13; TANNER, supra note 49, at
250-51.
75 TANNER, supra note 49, at 265.
67
68
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Afghanistan had become, and replaced him as president with
Mohammed Najibullah in 1987.76 The leadership change was to no
avail, however, as the mujahedeen’s guerilla tactics and strategic external
alliances forced the Soviet occupation to end.77
With the departure of the mujahedeen’s common enemy and
the country under the control of Communist-backed President
Najibullah, the struggle for power among tribal leaders and mujahedeen
commanders soon grew into a full-scale civil war.78 The Najibullah
government collapsed in 1992 when President Najibullah abandoned
the government and sought refuge in a U.N. Compound in Kabul.79
Soon thereafter, the country that had been saved from the Soviets by
the unified fighters of the mujahedeen was now caught in the crossfire
of a fierce civil war that would last until 1996.80
C. Civil War
The brutality of the civil war became ever more apparent with
increased reports of the destruction of villages by indiscriminate
mortar attacks, torturous acts of rape,81 kidnappings, and
executions.82 Former Junbish commander Rashid Dostum, former
76

See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 16; TANNER, supra note 49, at

77

See TANNER, supra note 49, at 266-70.
See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 16-17; TANNER, supra note 49, at

265-66.
78

271.
79

See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17; TANNER, supra note 49, at

80

See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17-21; TANNER, supra note 49, at

276.
276-80.
While there are reported acts of using rape as a weapon by both the
Soviets and their affiliated Afghan Army counterparts during the Soviet occupation,
the majority of the reported instances of using rape as a weapon to punish villages
and communities for suspected alliances with rival political and mujahedeen groups
was during the 1992-1996 Civil War. See AFG. JUST. PROJECT, CASTING SHADOWS:
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: 1978-2001, at 62 (2005)
[hereinafter
CASTING
SHADOWS],
http://afghanistanjusticeproject.org/
warcrimesandcrimesagainsthumanity19782001.pdf.
82 See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL, AND
FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA 21 (2d. ed. 2010) [hereinafter RASHID,
TALIBAN]; TANNER, supra note 49, at 276-80; CASTING SHADOWS, supra note 81, at
62.
81
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interim President Burhanuddin Rabbani, and former mujahedeen
commander Abdul Rasul Sayyaf each have been accused of leading
forces alleged to have committed some of the harshest human rights
violations on record during the Afghanistan Civil War era.83 In 1993,
the city of Kabul was pounded by indiscriminate rocket attacks and
firefights that left 30,000 killed and nearly 100,000 innocent civilians
wounded.84 Rabbani aligned with Sayyaf and wreaked havoc on the
Shiites, conducting ruthless beheadings of elderly men as well as
women and children.85 On the outskirts of the city, Dostum’s fighters
were using rape as a weapon in the communities and ruthlessly
executing innocent villagers.86 Shockingly, each of these three
suspected war criminals would find prominent positions in the
Karzai-led government following the ouster of the Taliban.
D. The Rise of the Taliban
In 1994, the legacy of the Taliban began when two young
girls were kidnapped and raped by a mujahedeen commander in a
village outside of Kandahar.87 Mohammed Omar, a young mullah, or
religious leader, gathered thirty of his religious students, armed them,
conducted an operation to free the girls, and subsequently hanged the
mujahedeen kidnapper.88 Hailed a hero by a local populace desperate
for order in a lawless land, Mullah Omar began to expand his
religious teachings, and the number of his Taliban fighters and
followers quickly grew.89 Mullah Omar claimed that the Taliban
83 See COLL, supra note 62, at 263; see also Saeed Shah, Karzai Backs Infamous Warlord to be Speaker, THE SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 29, 2011,
http://www.smh.com.au/world/karzai-backs-infamous-warlord-to-be-speaker20110128-1a8et.html.
84 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17-18; TANNER, supra note 49, at
277.
85 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17-18; TANNER, supra note 49, at
277.
86 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 17-18; TANNER, supra note 49, at
277.
87 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 25.
88 See CHARLES ALLEN, GOD’S TERRORISTS: THE WAHHABI CULT AND
THE HIDDEN ROOTS OF MODERN JIHAD 291 (2006); RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note
82, at 41-42.
89 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 18; TANNER, supra note 49, at
279.
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movement was based on the premise that “[the Taliban] were
fighting against Muslims who had gone wrong. How could [the
Taliban] remain quiet when [they] could see crimes being committed
against women and the poor?”90
After nearly a year of gaining control of provinces around the
country, the Taliban had to decide whether to attempt to capture
Kabul, or to retreat to Kandahar and regroup.91 Deciding to regroup
and reorganize in Kandahar, the Taliban held a shura, or meeting,
where the local religious leaders named Mullah Omar the Amir ul
Monimeen, or Commander of the Faithful.92 The next day, Mullah
Omar appeared wearing the cloak of the Prophet Mohammed,
essentially granting him the power to lead not just the Taliban but all
Muslims.93
In September of 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul94 and
instituted an intensely strict form of Sharia.95 Under Taliban rule, all
women were banned from working, all schools for girls were closed,
and women were required to wear burqas in order to be covered
completely from head to toe when outside of the home.96 The wolf
90

BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 18; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82,

91

See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 291; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at

92

See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 291; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at

93

See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 42.
See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 292; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at

at 25.
41-42.
42.
94

50-51.
Sharia is the “divinely ordained form of Islamic law” but there are vast
differences as to the implementation of such law. The Taliban followed and
vigorously enforced the strictest interpretation of Sharia anywhere in the world.
The strictest rules of Sharia imposed by the Taliban included a ban on all women’s
schooling, and forbidding women from working or leaving the home unless in the
presence of a male family member. Men were required to have a beard. Additionally, all television and music was banned as were games including chess, soccer, and
the popular game of kite flying. Persons caught stealing would have feet and/or
hands amputated as punishment. Persons who were caught committing adultery
would face public stoning. See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 291; BRISCOE ET AL., supra
note 57, at 21; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 50-51; TANNER, supra note 49, at
284.
96 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 50-51.
95
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was out of the sheep’s clothing as the Taliban were no longer the
saviors of Afghanistan, and were instead quickly imposing a brutal
reign of the harshest form of Sharia law the world had ever seen.97
After the successful capture of Kabul, the Taliban continued
their quest for national dominance by capturing the major cities of
Bagram and Jalalabad.98 While attempting to take the city of Mazar-eSharif, Dostum’s forces fought back and the Taliban not only
suffered severe casualties, but were also the victims of brutal war
crimes99 The Taliban fought back, captured Mazar-e-Sharif,100 and
moved on to the northern province of Bamyan, murdering innocent
villagers as their ruthless fighters ravaged the country that lay in their
path.101 After two years of fighting, the Taliban captured Bamyan in
2001 and the world gasped as they callously destroyed two sacred and
archaic Buddha statues.102 The Taliban were now front and center on
the world stage, but the response to their newfound infamy was a
separate matter.103
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See ALLEN, supra note 88, at 292; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at

50-51.
See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 21.
Post conflict investigations have unearthed reports of war crimes including mass executions of nearly 3,000 Taliban fighters by Malik and Dostum’s
men and reports of metal shipping containers full of Taliban prisoners of war under the care of Dostum’s men that died of suffocation and/or starvation, depending on the circumstance. See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 21; RASHID,
TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 63; TANNER, supra note 49, at 285; CASTING SHADOWS,
supra note 81, at 62.
100 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 68-75; TANNER, supra note 49,
at 285.
101 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 68-75; TANNER, supra note 49,
at 285.
102 The two Buddha statutes at Bamyan, carved into the cliffs, stood 165
and 114 feet high before the Taliban destroyed them. Built in the third and fifth
centuries A.D., they were known around the world as a historic relic to the religious
traditions of the past. The world community saw the intentional destruction of the
priceless relics as a final straw, and the Taliban finally had their attention. See
RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 18; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 68, 76;
TANNER, supra note 49, at 285.
103 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 76; TANNER, supra note 49, at
285.
98
99
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E. Introducing Al Qaeda
While world leaders were assessing the rapidly dissolving
situation in Afghanistan, the Saudi born leader of Al Qaeda, Osama
bin Laden,104 wasted no time in waging jihad against the West.105 In
August of 1998, Al Qaeda operatives bombed U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania.106 Two years later in October of 2000, Al Qaeda
operatives bombed the U.S.S. Cole while at port off the coast of
Yemen, killing seventeen U.S. Navy sailors.107
The failure of the world to recognize the Taliban as the
legitimate government of Afghanistan, and further sanction the group
for the human rights violations and atrocities being committed in
Afghanistan, created an ideal situation for Al Qaeda and the
Taliban.108 The Taliban needed both financial and logistical support
from outside of the country, likely from Arab backers; Al Qaeda
could provide this support if the Taliban would provide them a safe
harbor to train as the U.S. hunted them in response to the attacks on
U.S. embassies and the U.S.S. Cole.109 An accord was struck and a
mutually beneficial relationship began that continues today.110
With only the powerful warlord Massoud still standing in the
Taliban’s way of near complete control of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda
offered to assist the Taliban by sending two operatives posing as

104 Osama bin Laden was killed on Sunday, May 1, 2011, during a coordinated raid by U.S. Navy SEALS and CIA operatives in a compound in Pakistan.
Peter Baker, Bin Laden is Dead, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.
html?pagewanted=all.
105 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 76; TANNER, supra note 49, at
285.
106 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 134; TANNER, supra note 49, at
286.
107 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 286-87.
108 See RASHID, TALIBAN, supra note 82, at 132-40; TANNER, supra note
49, at 286-87.
109 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 18; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra
note 82, at 132-40; TANNER, supra note 49, at 286-87.
110 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 19; RASHID, TALIBAN, supra
note 82, at 132-40; TANNER, supra note 49, at 286-87.
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journalists to kill him.111 The mission succeeded, and Massoud died
on September 9, 2001.112 Massoud’s death allowed the Taliban to
further their dominance in the region, but it also increased their
reliance on Al Qaeda.113 Just two days later on September 11, 2001,
Al Qaeda operatives would crash four planes into targets in the
United States, resulting in the loss of nearly 3,000 innocent lives, and
marking the beginning of what would become known as the Global
War on Terror.114
F. Post 9/11 Afghanistan
The attacks on America on September 11, 2001 ushered in
yet another era of fighting for the war torn people of Afghanistan as
the United States-led Coalition Forces retaliated against Al Qaeda and
their Taliban hosts.115 In early October of 2001, U.S. Army Special
Operations Forces conducted various missions to secure airfields and
compounds, and directed air strikes in Afghanistan.116 After months
of intense fighting, bombing campaigns, and the arrival of
conventional forces, the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters were forced
to retreat, and the momentum belonged to the Coalition Forces.117
During this operational pause, the people of Afghanistan
took the opportunity to adopt an interim government, appointing
Hamid Karzai118 to serve as the interim President.119 This also marked
111 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 19; RASHID, DESCENT, supra
note 47, at 19; TANNER, supra note 49, at 287.
112 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 19; RASHID, DESCENT, supra
note 47, at 19; TANNER, supra note 49, at 287.
113 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 19.
114 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
311-13 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-911REPORT/pdf/GPO-911REPORT.pdf; TANNER, supra note
49, at 289-91.
115 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 295-97.
116 See BRISCOE ET AL., supra note 57, at 96-113; TANNER, supra note 49 at
295-300.
117 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 304.
118 Hamid Karzai was appointed the interim President of Afghanistan at
the International Conference on Afghanistan held in Bonn, Germany, in December
2001, where Afghan and international leaders decided on the temporary govern-
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the first time in nearly six years that the Afghan people could begin
rebuilding their country free from Taliban oppression.120 However,
some expressed concern that merely pushing the Taliban back
without defeating them left the door open for a resurgence of
violence.121 This premonition would prove true as Taliban and
Coalition Forces continue their back and forth struggle for control
even today.
III. PRELUDE TO MODERN RECONCILIATION
Throughout the course of the current war in Afghanistan,
several programs have been enacted to afford insurgent fighters the
opportunity to reconcile with the government.122 These programs
have met with mixed results, but a common theme is that none has
resulted in long-term implementation or sustained success.123
One of the first examples of a failed reconciliation program
in the post-9/11 conflict was the Afghanistan New Beginnings
Program (“ANBP”).124 The ANBP provided the Afghan government
assistance in implementing a Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (“DDR”) program for militant forces that wished to
turn in their weapons and join the new Afghan National Army or

ment and leadership. See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 95-96. In October of
2004, Karzai was elected President of Afghanistan in the country’s first democratic
election since the ousting of the Taliban in 2001. Karzai Declared Afghan President,
BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3977677.stm (last updated Nov. 3,
2004, 12:45 GMT). In 2009, he was elected to his second term as President of Afghanistan in a second democratic election. Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai Declared
Elected President of Afghanistan, CNN.COM, Nov. 2, 2009, http://articles.cnn.com
/2009-11-02/world/afghanistan.election.runoff_1_azizullah-lodin-abdullahabdullah-president-hamid-karzai?_s=PM:WORLD.
119 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 96-97; TANNER, supra note
49, at 307-08.
120 See RASHID, DESCENT, supra note 47, at 96-97; TANNER, supra note
49, at 307-08.
121 See TANNER, supra note 49, at 304.
122 See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 51-66.
123 See id.
124 See Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, UNDP, http://www.anbp.
af.undp.org/homepage/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
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Afghan National Police.125 Applying the policies set forth in the
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (“DIAG”), the ANBP
mandated that members of illegal armed factions turn in their
weapons and provide the government of Afghanistan with lists of
individuals serving in these anti-military forces.126 While the DDR
appears to have had success in the collection of weapons, the ANBP
as a whole did not have a structure in place to provide sustained
socio-economic support to those individuals renouncing their
previous affiliation with illegal armed factions.127 As result, the
ANBP’s success was minimal.128
Another reconciliation program that has met with limited
success is the Program Takhim-e-Sohl (“PTS”), or Strengthening
Through Peace Program.129 Introduced in 2005, the goal of PTS was
to provide a means for former combatants to reconcile with the
government in return for their safety from future military action by
Afghan and Coalition Forces.130 By 2007, reports claimed that more
than 4,000 former combatants had participated in PTS, but
inconsistencies and questionable reporting mar the integrity of these
reports.131 The PTS program failed to sustain long-term success in
part because of the lack of clear guidance for, and efficient
management by, the local offices responsible for the program’s
See Ali Ahmed, Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme Client Satisfaction
Survey: Comparative Analysis, UNDP, July 31, 2005, http://erc.undp.org/
evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=1064; Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, supra note 124.
126 See Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme, supra note 124.
127 See ROBIN-EDWARD POULTON, DIAG EVALUATION: DISBANDMENT
OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN, A PROJECT OF THE UNITED
NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME AND AFGHANISTAN’S NEW BEGINNINGS
PROGRAMME (ANBP) 14-15 (Apr. 22, 2009), http://erc.undp.org/
evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=3451.
128 See id.
129 See Former Taliban Commander Joins Forces With Afghan Government, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERV., Aug. 8, 2005, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.
aspx?id=16943.
130 See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 39.
131 See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 39; MARISSA QUIE, PEACE-BUILDING
AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN AFGHANISTAN: THE APRP AND
RECONCILIATION WITH THE TALIBAN 14 (Sept. 11, 2010), http://stockholm.sgir.
eu/uploads/sigir%206.pdf.
125
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execution.132 Additionally, a lack of senior level insurgent commander
participation in the program, a failure to combine the program with a
demobilization process, and a lack of international support also
contributed to the program’s failure.133 Further, combatants had little
trust that the program would fulfill the promises it made due to
allegations of corruption. In particular, the safety of the reconciled
fighters could not be guaranteed.134
IV. THE AFGHANISTAN PEACE AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAM
Faced with a deteriorating security situation, the decreasing
political will on the part of the Coalition forces to wage long-term
war, and a populace yearning for a stable and peaceful country, the
Afghan government’s most recent attempt at reconciliation includes a
revision of previous strategies.135 The APRP is based on the
recommendations of Afghan delegates of the Consultative Peace
Jirga, presented at the London Conference in June of 2010, and
formalized in July of the same year.136 The APRP is based on three
pillars: (1) strengthening security and promoting peace and
reintegration through civilian governance; (2) improving the political
process to provide a longstanding peace for the populace; and (3)
providing local, regional, and international support in establishing
peace and stability.137 The peace and reintegration process of the first
pillar is divided into two categories: operational and strategic/political
levels.138 The operational level addresses how to engage low-level
fighters locally in their villages and districts.139 More sensitive issues
arise with respect to the reintegration of senior-level insurgent
commanders, the strategic/political level of the operation.140

132
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See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 41; QUIE, supra note 131, at 14.
See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 41; QUIE, supra note 131, at 14.
See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 39-40; QUIE, supra note 131, at 14.
See APRP, supra note 4, at 3.
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Id.
Id.
Id.

410

2012

Carlson

1:2

A. Phase One: Social Outreach and Grievance Resolution
Regardless of the category the individual falls in, the threephase peace and reintegration process remains the same.141 The first
phase includes social outreach programs, negotiations, and grievance
resolution.142 This step is vital because the community plays an
integral role in accepting and reintegrating the reconciled combatant
into the community.143 Perhaps one of the most important aspects of
this stage is the grievance resolution process available to combatants
and their victims.144
The APRP, however, only allows for resolution of those
grievances that are “creating armed resistance and violence and those
linked to dissatisfaction with governance.”145 This language of the
APRP creates concern for human rights groups because, while
current grievances are addressed, the program fails to offer a means
for victims of prior crimes to seek redress.146 During the negotiation
and grievance resolution process, if an irreconcilable conflict arises
and neither the local leaders, third party mediators, nor the
government can help resolve the grievance, relocation of the
reconciled former fighter may be available within or outside of
Afghanistan.147 It is also recognized that this crucial first step may
take a substantial amount of time and, as such, may be completed
simultaneous to phase two of the peace and reintegration process.148
B. Phase Two: Demobilization
The second phase occurs when a fighter renounces violence,
accepts the laws and the Constitution of Afghanistan, agrees to live
by those laws, and demobilizes.149 Once this occurs, the individual
becomes eligible for amnesty as described in the existing
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 5-10.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 6-7, 10.
See id. at 6-7.
See id. at 5-10.
See id. at 10.
See id. at 6-7, 10.
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Reconciliation and Amnesty Law.150 This law allows for political
amnesty for anti-government fighters dating back as far as the
beginning of the Soviet invasion in 1979.151 Once deemed eligible for
amnesty under the APRP, ex-combatants register their weapons and
their biometric data is collected.152 If the individual is a detainee, he is
released to a community that agrees to support his social
reintegration process.153
C. Phase Three: Consolidation of Peace and Community Recovery
The final phase of the APRP is the consolidation of peace
and community recovery.154 This phase provides a menu of options
that, while not available in its entirety to all communities due to
diverse socio-economic needs and varying security requirements,
have one goal: to provide a basic structure to get the fighter and the
community started on a path to successful reintegration and sustained
peace.155 Consolidation of peace and community recovery is achieved
through educational and occupational opportunities that benefit not
only the newly reconciled former fighter, but also the community that
chooses to embrace him.156
D. APRP: Noble Aspirations, Poor Execution
In theory, the APRP seeks to achieve a sustainable peace for
Afghanistan by utilizing community and international support to
entice fighters to leave their anti-government networks and align
themselves with the legitimate government of Afghanistan.157 In
reality, there are aspects of the APRP that provide hurdles to achieve
this noble and very necessary goal. Born from corruption, the
legislature created the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law not to
support the Justice Action Plan, but instead to protect its own
members, as many of them feared prosecution for their past
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

See id. at 6-7; Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, supra note 1, art. 3.
See Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, supra note 1, art. 3.
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See id. at 10, 14-17.
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crimes.158 As a result, the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law failed to
provide an end date for granting amnesty to fighters actively engaged
in conflict against the government of Afghanistan. Once combined
with the implementing guidance of APRP, the Reconciliation and
Amnesty Law continues to grant amnesty to broad classes of antigovernment fighters but fails to provide a means for victims of
crimes committed during the last three decades of armed conflict to
seek justice.
V. THE APRP AND THE RECONCILIATION AND AMNESTY LAW:
FORGOTTEN VICTIMS
A. Legislation Born From Corruption
As discussed above, the Justice Action Plan provided a
comprehensive approach to transitional justice in Afghanistan.159 One
of the plan’s key provisions created a truth commission that would
investigate past abuses and injustices and advise the legislature on
how to address such abuses in the future.160 Unfortunately, the
legislature’s members, including people like notorious war criminal
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,161 thereafter drafted the Reconciliation and
Amnesty Law, which protects criminals and does next to nothing to
assist victims seeking truth or justice.

See SEMPLE, supra note 36, at 59-60.
See JUSTICE ACTION PLAN, supra note 33.
160 See id.
161 Abdul Rasul Sayyaf is notorious for his ruthless crimes against the
Hazaras during the civil war. Sayyaf, leader of the Wahhabi Ittihad-i-Islami group,
fled Afghanistan in the late 1980’s to the Philippines where he began the Abu
Sayyaf Group, a known terrorist group with radical Wahhabist views. See ALLEN,
supra note 88, at 287. He is also reported to have trained Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the “mastermind of 9/11.” 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 114, at
149. Most recently, however, President Karzai is reported to have been supporting
the election of Sayyaf to the position of Speaker of the House in the legislature in
Afghanistan’s government, another indication of problems within Karzai’s government and his failure to identify with the people of Afghanistan. See Shah, Karzai
Backs Infamous Warlord to be Speaker, supra note 83.
158
159
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B. Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, Standing Alone
The Reconciliation and Amnesty Law places a heavy burden
on the victims of war crimes and human rights abuses. The law’s first
section allows for the reconciliation of any anti-government faction,
political party, or hostile party who fought against the government
prior to the establishment of the Interim Administration.162 Section
one also affords these individuals general amnesty so that they “shall
not be legally or judicially prosecuted.”163 The law’s second section
goes on to state that those who are currently engaged in armed
conflict with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, but choose to
cease and reconcile, shall enjoy the benefits of amnesty and
reconciliation should they accept the constitution and choose to
abide by the laws.164 The first section permits amnesty for anyone
who committed a crime against the Afghan government from as early
as the Soviet invasion of 1979. Because of the open date in the law’s
second section, those who continue to commit hostile acts might be
granted amnesty in the future as well.165
This open-ended construction arguably allows more
combatants to reconcile with the government because the country
remains actively engaged in armed conflict. The purpose of the law is,
after all, to encourage fighters to cease fighting in opposition to the
government and become part of a unified and peaceful
Afghanistan.166 However, the law also provides a convenient escape
when these fighters are known targets of Afghan and Coalition
Forces. One of the benefits of reconciling with the government is not
only amnesty from prosecution of previous hostile acts against the
government, but also removal from targeting lists or “black-lists.”167
The removal of reconciled fighters from these lists is an important
step in gaining the trust of the ex-combatants as they reintegrate into
the community. However, when abused, this step provides a
convenient operational pause for fighters who seek refuge under the
162
163
164
165
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See Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, supra note 1, art.3, § 1.
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guise that they are participating in a legitimate program when they
have no intent to fully reconcile. Revision of the Reconciliation and
Amnesty Law by adding an end date for available reconciled fighters
to participate in the program could alleviate that problem.
C. Implementing the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law with the
APRP: Forgetting Twenty Years of Victims
As mentioned above in the discussion of the historical
underpinnings leading to the current political situation in
Afghanistan, many human rights violations from the previous three
decades remain unanswered. Some of the alleged human rights
violations most relevant to this discussion include the alleged
beheadings and rapes committed by Barhnuddin Rabbani’s men
during the Afghan Civil War in 1993.168 Rabbani then served as the
interim President of Afghanistan.169 Rabbani, who was never charged
or convicted of his alleged war crimes, recently served as the chair of
the High Peace Council, the organization responsible for overseeing
the implementation of the APRP.170 In September 2011, a suicide
bomber gained access to Rabbani’s compound, killing Rabbani and
four other members of the High Peace Council.171 The immediate
question that arises from Rabbani’s recent position and very critical
responsibilities stems directly from the scars of the civil war that have
not been overshadowed by modern conflict. Was it possible for
Rabbani, an alleged perpetrator of war crimes, to effectively
implement and oversee a reconciliation and reintegration program
that includes not only amnesty for war criminals, but also a grievance
resolution process for victims of such atrocities? With his death,
perhaps there is no answer to that question. However, the process
that put an alleged violator of human rights in charge of overseeing
the peace process in a war-ravaged country should be carefully
scrutinized.
See COLL, supra note 62, at 263.
See TANNER, supra note 49, at 277.
170 See APRP, supra note 4, at 3.
171 See Former Afghanistan President Burhnuddin Rabbani Killed in Kabul Blast,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Sept. 20, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8776911/Former-Afghanistan-presidentBurhanuddin-Rabbani-killed-in-Kabul-blast.html.
168
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Perhaps the intent of the APRP is simply to forgive all alleged
war criminals and forget their crimes so that the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan can move forward and free itself from the previous three
decades of brutality. Can this amnesty approach work in a country
that has been ravaged by war for thirty years and has so many war
crimes yet to be addressed?
The reality of the APRP might be very clearly reflected in the
text of the plan itself. The program focuses on “those grievances that
are creating armed resistance and violence and those linked to
dissatisfaction with governance. It cannot tackle all long-term
grievances in Afghanistan.”172 The plain language of the document,
which became effective in July of 2010, indicates that the grievance
resolution process is available to those seeking redress for current
grievances, and specifically declares that those victims of the past will
not be considered because the government simply “cannot tackle”
their concerns. Moreover, the APRP fails to utilize the resources
available to resolve grievances from previous conflicts.173 While
perhaps understandable given the fact that the country is currently
engaged in armed conflict and peace is the immediate goal, the
explicit exclusion of previous perpetrators and victims of war crimes
raises several concerns. How will victims of war crimes that occurred
prior to the modern Global War on Terror era seek justice? Who is
eligible to seek justice for those victims who are gone but whose
perpetrators remain and whose crimes remain unaccounted for?
There is no avenue for survivors of slain victims to heal the wounds
of war and the unnecessary loss of those that they love.
Another concern of the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law
stems from its over-inclusiveness, as it permits amnesty for the
perpetrators of crimes dating back more than thirty years.174 The
APRP implements the Reconciliation and Amnesty Law by providing
for the reintegration of current fighters who wish to reconcile with
the Afghan government according to the terms of the APRP, and
authorizes amnesty from prosecution for those deemed eligible.
APRP, supra note 4, at 12.
See id. at 12-13.
174 See Reconciliation and Amnesty Law, supra note 1, art.3, § 2; APRP,
supra note 4, at 10, 14-17.
172
173
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Because the APRP only addresses current and recent fighters, but
existing legislation permits reconciliation and amnesty for a broader
population of perpetrators, the question remains as to how to
respond to those from previous conflicts who wish to avail
themselves of the reconciliation process. There is no incentive for exfighters to maintain a life of peace when they are excluded from the
support the APRP can provide. If anything, the APRP may entice
them to take up arms again so that they may become eligible for the
programs offered by the APRP. Further, what framework is in place
to ensure that the reconciled combatants from previous conflicts
maintain their commitment to the government of Afghanistan, and
what support is available to assist them in this endeavor?
Perhaps the more significant failure of the Reconciliation and
Amnesty Law relates to the victims of the crimes. One example of
this failure is Rashid Dostum, whose victims included not only
innocent villagers but also members of the Taliban. Dostum is
alleged to have taken hundreds of Taliban prisoners captive and
transported them in large metal shipping containers over many
miles.175 Few of those prisoners survived, and Dostum has never
been prosecuted for these alleged crimes.176 In fact, Dostum recently
served in the Karzai administration as both the Afghan Army Chief
of Staff and Deputy Defense Minister.177 While victims are
traditionally thought to be people like Aisha and young Shafiq,
history reveals that there are Taliban victims as well.
It defies logic that the Afghan government would ask
members of the Taliban to reconcile when they hypocritically employ
one of the most notorious offenders of human rights. Further, the
government not only allows such perpetrators to be safe from
prosecution for their crimes, but also fails to provide a grievance
resolution process for the victims or their families.
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CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that the challenges facing the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan are daunting. The last thirty years have taken
an immense toll on the Afghan people, creating generations who
know only war and have yet to experience peace. Government efforts
to move the county forward have focused only on reconciling with
former combatants, while leaving thousands of victims of violence
and their families without the opportunity to seek justice.178
The APRP has done a fair job assessing the needs of
combatants using a multi-phased, community based approach to
provide a sustainable reintegration program.179 It is, of course, not
without faults: the victims of the modern conflict have an
opportunity to be heard while many of the victims from earlier
decades are left seeking justice. Rather than ignoring these victims,
the government needs to provide a mechanism to resolve their
grievances. During a time when building trust is crucial to the success
of the nation’s future, a critical step in the healing process is
implementing a program that achieves a sense of justice for all
victims before eliminating the threat of prosecution for their
perpetrators.
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